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DEFAMATION IN
STUDENT PUBLICATIONS*
S

for college and high school publications are
typically unaware of the danger of legal liability for libel. This
situation presents a dilemma to the administrative officers of various
educational institutions who must minimize the possibility of extensive
liability for defamation. The problem demands a degree of supervision sufficient to protect against such liability, yet mild enough to
preserve the academic freedom of the student writer. This note
represents an attempt to evaluate the legal problems involved and
to arrive at some conclusions upon which to base an approach to
the organization and operation of such student publications.
For purposes of the discussion of the question of a qualified
privilege, the concept of "student publication" used is that of a
publication written and edited by students and intended primarily for
circulation to students, such as student newspapers, literary magazines,
yearbooks and circulars. Excluded from this concept are publications such as law reviews which, though primarily written and edited
by students, are intended to have a broad student and non-student
readership. Furthermore, the discussion of the qualified privilege
assumes that the matter published is, in fact, libelous under ordinary
common-law standards. The discussion will center on matters peculiar to student publications but will include a brief presentation of
the developments in the law of libel which apply generally to all
publications.
TUDENTS WHO WRITE

The Conditional or Qualified Privilege
The law has long recognized that there are certain circumstances
in which conduct which would otherwise be actionable will not be
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treated as such because, as a matter of
social policy, it is found that some interest or relation outweighs in importance
the harm which flows from that conduct.
In such a case, the actor who would
otherwise be held liable in damages is
accorded a privilege which will operate
as a defense to an action based on that
conduct. In the area of defamation, there
are three general situations in which a
person who publishes otherwise actionable
defamatory matter is accorded a conditional or qualified privilege: (1) where
the publisher believes that facts exist
which affect a sufficiently important interest of the publisher and the recipient's
knowledge of the defamatory matter will
be of service in the protection of that
interest; (2) where the publisher believes
that a sufficiently important interest of
the recipient or of a third person will be
affected by the existence of certain facts
and the publisher is under a legal or
moral duty to disclose those facts; and,
(3) where any one of several persons
having a common interest in a particular
subject matter correctly or reasonably believes that facts exist which should be
disclosed to another sharing that common
interest.' The third situation is particularly relevant to the present discussion:
The common interest of members of
religious, fraternal, charitable or other
non-profit associations . . . is recognized
as sufficient to support a privilege for
communications among themselves concerning the qualifications of the officers
and members and their participation in
2
the activities of the society.
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The privilege recognized in regard to such
organizations is "qualified" in the sense
that it applies only if the use of the privilege is not abused. The privilege can be
"lost" if the defamatory matter in question bears no relation to the community
of interest which the privilege is designed
to protect, if the publisher's primary motivation is malice rather than furtherance
of that common interest, if the publication
is unnecessarily extensive in that it was
made to persons not sharing the common
interest or if the publisher has no honest
belief or no reasonable grounds for belief
in the truth of the matter which he communicates.
In the courts, this qualified privilege
based on a community of interest has
been clearly recognized, especially in
cases involving labor unions and communications between the officers and membership of such unions concerning union
affairs. In Garriga v. Townsend,' the
plaintiff was an organizer and vice-president of the Hotel Employees Union and
defendants were officers of the Bartenders
Union. Defendants published an article
in their official union newspaper alleging
that the plaintiff was guilty of malfeasance in office. In plaintiff's ensuing libel
action, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the defendants' claim of qualified privilege, but the appellate division
reversed this dismissal on the ground that
plaintiff's complaint alleged malice, which
if proven at the trial, would overcome the
privilege asserted by the defendants. In
its opinion, the court gave explicit recognition to the defense of qualified privilege

- 285 App. Div. 199,
Dep't 1954).

136 N.Y.S.2d 295
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in a situation where the communication is
made in " 'good faith . . .limited in its
scope to . . . [a proper purpose], a
proper occasion and publication in a
proper manner and to proper parties
only.'
In Lubliner v. Reinlib,5 the
court stated that a union official is prima
facie privileged to address communications to the officers and members on
matters of union welfare and common
interest. Similarly, the court in Meyers v.
Huschle Bros., Inc.6 held that an employer is privileged to communicate with
his employees on the subject of their joining a union whose leaders he alleges are
"un-American," particularly so where the
circular Was exclusively for employees
and "relevant to a proper discharge of
the employer's duty concerning a matter
in which they had a mutual interest." 7
"I

In two more recent cases, the key factor in determining the availability of the
defense of qualified privilege was the extent of the circulation of the publications
containing the defamatory matter. In
Aacon Contracting Co. v. Herrman,8 the
plaintiff corporation was involved in a
labor dispute with the Teamsters Union
and a strike resulted. Defendants were
the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists and several of its officers. The Association had published an article in The
Labor Leader in which it charged the
plaintiff with unfair and illegal labor prac-

tices. In plaintiff's resulting libel action,
the defendants interposed a multipronged
defense of truth, fair comment, justification and qualified privilege. In rejecting
the qualified privilege defense, the court
stated that such a privilege extends to
anyone who has a legal, social or moral
obligation to others which obligation is
fulfilled by the communication of facts
bearing on an interest which they share
but does not extend to communications
to the public generally. The court found
that The Labor Leader had a "wide and
varied" circulation including many who
were not members of the Association and
that anyone could become a subscriber
by merely submitting his name and address.
In light of these facts [excessive publication] the allegations . . . to the effect
that the publishers have long 'had a deep
interest in promoting just, moral and
equitable relations between management
and labor,' that its readers have a similar
interest, cannot support, either legally or
logically, the defense of qualified privilege.9
Two years later, the extent of circulation was again determinative of the question of the availability of the defense of
qualified privilege in DeLury v. Wurf.1°
Plaintiff was the president of the Sanitation Workers Union and defendant was
president of a rival municipal employees
union which published The Public Employees Press. Plaintiff brought a libel

4 Id.

at 201, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
562 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
6 274 App. Div. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1st Dep't
1948).
IId. at 82, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
8 27 Misc. 2d 197, 208 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup.

Old. at 205, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
1035 Misc. 2d 593, 230 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup.
Ct.), af0'd mem., 17 App. Div. 2d 917, 233

Ct. 1960),

N.Y.S.2d 238 (1st Dep't 1962).
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action based on statements made in that
publication and defendant asserted the
defense of qualified privilege. On a motion to strike the defense, the court recognized the common interest of the union
official and the members of a union as a
sufficient basis for the assertion of the
qualified privilege defense and specifically
stated that,
where as in the instant case, the answer
pleads that the pertinent publication went
only to the membership of the labor organizations involved, it prima facie sets
up a proper defense. .... 1
The court distinguished Aacon because in
that case there had been wide and varied
circulation beyond the group affected
with the common interest, while in the
instant case the publication had been circulated only to members of the two
unions involved. It should also be noted
that the same principles have been applied to the publications of religious organizations in Moyle v. Franz 12 where a
qualified privilege defense was rejected
because the publication was available to
anyone willing to pay the subscription
price.' 8
As can be seen, the defense of qualified privilege is available where a communication is made in good faith, in relation to a matter in which the publisher
and the recipient share a common interest, published only to those sharing
that common interest, and published with
11 d. at 595-96, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
12267 App. Div. 423, 46 N.Y.S.2d 667 (2d
Dep't 1944).
1' See also Kaplan v. Gawron, 66 N.Y.S.2d 63
(Sup. Ct. 1946), where a motion for summary
judgment on qualified privilege was denied for
failure to plead circulation limited to persons
having a common interest.
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a reasonable belief in the truth of the
matters stated.
The application of these principles to
student publications requires an analysis
of the "interest" which the student writer
and his student readers share. The argument can be made that students, as students, share a common interest in everything and everyone that can be the subject
of learning and, therefore, the applicable
range of "interest" is as broad as the
world itself. Though this position has a
degree of plausibility, the legal status of
the student publication must be resolved
in terms of the law as stated by the courts
in the analogous situations of union, fraternal and religious publications of limited
circulation. An objective legal evaluation
of the legal status of such publications
compels the conclusion that, because the
courts have been unwilling to extend
the qualified privilege, student publications
will be recognized as having a qualified
privilege as to otherwise defamatory matters only in those areas of easily identifiable "academic" interest. In other words,
it is likely that matters published about
wholly non-academic questions or persons
would be held to be without the scope
of the privilege, and that matters pubfished about issues and persons with only
a tenuous connection with academic affairs would present close questions as to
the applicability of the privilege. Particularly relevant to the question of "common interest" is the Aacon case in which
the court rejected a broad claim of common interest between an organization of
trade unionists and its non-member
readers. Though not precisely parallel to
the student publication situation (since
the assumption is that the circulation will
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be limited to students), the case does indicate a judicial reluctance to liberally
apply the privilege since it is, as a privilege, an exception to the general rule. Accordingly, the conclusion drawn here is
that student publications, within the case
law presented above, would be entitled to
the defense of qualified privilege, but only
as to those publications concerning what
would generally be considered "academic
matters," i.e., those matters closely related
to the curriculum, faculty, administration
and students of the institution involved.

This position is based upon the language used in the cases dealing with
other situations of common interest em-

phasizing that the matter must pertain to
the particular interests of the organizational structure within which the defamatory statements are made. In the cases
discussed above, the statements pertained
to peculiarly union matters. In compari-

son to the argument that students have
an almost infinitely broad common interest, it can also be argued that, especially in a democratic society, each
individual has an interest, however remote, in everything that occurs in the
world around him since everything that
happens will ultimately affect him, how-

ever remotely or minutely.

Were this

argument accepted, it would amount to

an abolition of the law of defamation
without any protection for those defamed
other than the good faith of those who

choose to speak or write about them.
Clearly, the argument goes too far and
will not be accepted by the courts. Having drawn this conclusion as to the scope
and applicability of the qualified privilege,
the various aspects of the privilege and
the ways in which it can be defeated will
now be discussed.

Qualified Privilege-Defeasibility
This qualified privilege based on a

community of interest is subject to defeat
by the plaintiff's showing an abuse of the
privilege. The abuse may take various
forms: (1) a lack of an honest belief in

the truth of the statements made; (2)
lack of reasonable grounds for any such
belief; (3) publication made to persons
who have no interest in the matter published and whose knowledge cannot reasonably be expected to further the protection of a legitimate interest; or (4)
publication of the false and defamatory
matter for an improper, malicious purpose
and not to further the interest for the protection of which the privilege is extended.14
The first basis for defeat of the privilege
is the fact that "the policy upon which all
conditional privileges are based is the
desirability of communicating information
which, if true, is important to the protection or promotion of some interest which,
because of its importance, the law protects." 15 Thus, where the defendant has
no good faith belief in the truth of the
statements which he publishes, he can in
no sense be said to be furthering the protected interest. In such a case, the defendant's plea of qualified privilege will be
defeated by a showing of a lack of good
faith belief.' So too, even if the defendant claims a good faith belief in the truth
of the defamatory statements, his plea of
qualified privilege will be overcome if the
'IF.

HARPER,

TORTS §252

MENT OF TORTS §§599-604
15 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §

(1933);

RESTATE-

(1934).
600, comment a at

264 (1934).
16Teichner v. Bellan, 7 App. Div. 2d 247, 181
N.Y.S.2d 842 (4th Dep't 1959); Nunan v.
Bullman, 256 App. Div. 741, 12 N.Y.S.2d 51
(3d Dep't 1939).
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plaintiff can show that no reasonable
grounds for such belief existed. But, the
plaintiff, to do so, must show more than
mere negligence or a want of sound judgment; rather, he must show facts indicating something approaching a "wanton and
reckless disregard" for the plaintiff's
rights which would be equivalent to actual malice.17 The more frequent basis
for the defeat of the privilege is found in
excessive publication of the defamatory
matter, i.e., publication to persons who do
not share the common interest upon
which the privilege is based and whose
knowledge of the defamatory matter will
be of no value in protecting that interest.
A good example of such a situation can
be found in the Aacon I case in which
the qualified privilege of the Trade Union
Association publication was defeated because it was available to anyone who
wished to subscribe and was not limited
to persons sharing a common interest in
matters directly pertinent to the affairs of
the organization itself. Similarly, in Moyle
v. Franz,19 the defendant's plea of qualified privilege was defeated because its
publication, The Watchtower, was available to anyone willing to pay the sub20
scription price. In contrast, the DeLury
case indicates that publication must be
limited to those persons sharing the com-

'7Loewinthan
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mon interest involved if the privilege is
to be upheld. It is important to note,
however, that there is some room for
flexibility in the application of this requirement. Incidental or unavoidable
publication to persons other than those
sharing the relevant common interest will
not be sufficient to defeat the privilege:
Often the only practicable means of communicating defamatory matter involves a
probability or even a certainty that it
will reach many persons whose knowledge of it is of no value in accomplish-

ing the purpose for which the privilege
is given. In such a case, the publication
is not excessive ....21
Finally, the catch-all method of defeating
the privilege is publication for an improper, malicious purpose. Initially, it
must be pointed out that falsity alone
will not be a sufficient basis for inferring
malice.2
But, the language of the defamatory statement may be so intemperate, violent or exaggerated as to allow
an inference of a malicious purpose inconsistent with the reputed purpose of
protecting or furthering a common interest.2 3 However, if the publication was
made for the primary purpose of protecting a common interest, the fact that
there is some indication of resentment
or indignation at the supposed misconduct
of the person defamed will not constitute
an abuse of the occasion.2 4 Procedurally,

v. Le Vine, 270 App. Div. 512,

60 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1st Dep't 1946).
IsAacon Contracting Co. v. Herrman, 27 Misc.
2d 197, 208 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
1"267 App. Div. 423, 46 N.Y.S.2d 667 (2d
Dep't 1944).
20DeLury v. Wurf, 35 Misc. 2d 593, 230
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct.), a/'d mern., 17 App.
Div. 2d 917, 233 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1st Dep't
1962).

21

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 604, comment a

at 269 (1934).

See also F. HARPER, TORTS

§252 (1933).
22Davis v. Dun & Bradstreet,

Inc.,

9 App.

Div. 2d 796, 92 N.Y.S.2d 674 (3d Dep't 1959).
23Hinrichs v. Butts, 149 App. Div. 236, 133
N.Y.S. 769 (2d Dep't 1912).
24 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 603,
comment a

at 269 (1934).
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the defendant must establish facts sufficient to indicate a privileged communication; when he does, the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove both the falsity of the
statements and abuse of the privilege by
25
the defendant.
As applied to student publications, the
above grounds for defeat of the qualified
privilege are rather clear and unambiguous. Responsibility would seem to be the
key to the maintenance of the privilege
and, though responsibility can be said
to be a sure preventive for liability of
any kind, it would seem that students
can and should be expected to meet higher
than ordinary standards in this regard.
It would also seem that student "idealism"
and commitment to "causes" would be
important evidentiary factors in an attempt
to defeat a defense of qualified privilege
on the ground of malice. In addition,
maintenance of the publication as one of
limited circulation, intended primarily for
students, is essential. In this regard, incidental or unavoidable distribution to
persons other than students would not
seem to be enough to defeat the privilege,
especially in light of the language in the
DeLury, Aacon and Moyle cases which
centered on the intended availability of
the publications involved in those cases.
In both Aacon and Moyle, the privilege
was defeated by proof of excessive publication, i.e., the publications were available to anyone willing to pay the subscription price, whereas, in DeLury, the
defense was established prima facie by a

25 Collier v. Postur Cereal Co., 150 App. Div.

169, 134 N.Y.S. 847 (Ist Dep't 1912);
Hinrichs v. Butts, 149 App. Div. 236, 133
N.Y.S. 769 (2d Dep't 1912).

showing that the publication was intended
to be available only to members of the
unions involved. The conclusion to be
drawn from these cases is that a showing
of an intended availability to students
and academic personnel only will be sufficient to overcome any claim of excessive
publication, even though there was incidental or unavoidable publication to
persons other than those for whom it was
primarily intended. Thus, control and
sharp delineation of the degree of circulation is a key element to be established
in order to ensure the application of the
qualified privilege.
The caution required to assure the
availability of the qualified privilege to
student publications will, unfortunately,
not always be met. The interests of
student journalists may extend to matters
well beyond the academic world. They
may intend their words regarding these
matters to be circulated among the general community.
In view of such a
situation, it is necessary to consider the
rules of liability applicable to all types
of publications.
"Public Officials" and
"Public Figures"
Traditional common-law rules of liability for defamation in publications 21 concerning public affairs and persons underwent a radical change with the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 7 There
the Court held that a state cannot, under
the first and fourteenth amendments,
2'For purposes of the following discussion no
distinction is made as to the character of the
publication involved.
27376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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award damages to a "public official" for
a defamatory statement concerning his
official conduct unless he can establish
actual malice, i.e., that the statement was
made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard as to its truth
or falsity. Under this standard, mere
negligence in regard to the determination
of truth or falsity is insufficient to establish
the required malice. The Court expressly
disavowed any attempt to decide how far
down into the ranks of officialdom the
category of "public official" would go.
It should also be noted that three Justices
(Black, Goldberg and Douglas), while
concurring in the result, contended that
the fourteenth amendment did not merely
delimit the states' power to award damages for defamation to public officials
but, rather, prohibited them from doing so
since they regarded the privilege to comment on public officials as absolute. Two
years later, the public official category was
explained by the Court in Rosenblatt v.
Baer.28 The Court did not delineate precisely the scope of the term "public
official" but generally described him as
one who is an employee of the government having, or appearing to the public
to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental
affairs. 29 Furthermore, the Court rejected
a contention that status as a public official
should be determined according to state
law, recognizing that the acceptance of
such a guideline would impose confusion
and uncertainty on the exercise of the
first amendment freedom sought to be
protected by the Times standard. A fur-
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ther extension of the right to publish in
areas of public concern was made in the
cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 30
and Associated Press v. Walker.31 Neither
case involved a public official as defined
by Rosenblatt, but the Court found that
both plaintiffs were "public figures."
Butts qualified because of his position as
athletic director of the University of
Georgia (he was deemed not employed
by the state even though the university
was a public institution) and Walker because of his former status as an Army
General and because of his political prominence at the time of the events upon
which the allegedly defamatory remarks
were based. The Court stated a new
standard to govern such situations: a
"public figure" who is not a "public
official" may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood, the substance of
which makes damage*to reputation apparent, if he can show highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigating and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. In applying this new
standard, the Court made a distinction
between the types of "news" involved
and the resulting difference in responsible
publishing standards.
Walker involved
an Associated Press reporter covering the
riots at the University of Mississippi precipitated by the admission of James
Meredith. The report sent by the reporter to the Associated Press office stated
that Walker had taken charge of a group
of rioters and led them in a charge against

'30388 U.S. 130 (1967).
2s383 U.S. 75 (1966).
29

Id. at 85.

"' Decided together with Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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federal marshals. The Court held that
since the incident could be considered
"hot" news, requiring immediate dissemination without any opportunity to pursue
a thorough investigation, there was no
severe departure from accepted publishing
standards. In Butts, however, the story
was an expos6 published in a weekly
magazine and it was based, in large part,
on the report of a person who claimed
that he had overheard a telephone conversation between the plaintiff and a rival
school's football coach in which plaintiff
had reputedly given information which
would assure his team's losing an impending game. The Court found that
there was ample time and opportunity
in which to investigate the truth of the
charge but that defendant had failed to
take even the most fundamental precautions to assure the accuracy of the story.
The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting
a severe departure from ordinary publishing standards and, therefore, upheld
an award of damages to the plaintiff.
It seems clear from these cases that
there is a wide latitude within which
publications concerning "public officials"
and "public figures" can be made without
fear of liability for defamation. What
must be avoided if liability is to be precluded are the extremes of "reckless,"
"wanton," "highly unreasonable" and
"severe" departures from ordinary publishing standards. The Butts case, however, indicates that the area is not without danger in that a failure to investigate
the facts upon which the statements are
based, when there is an opportunity to
do so according to ordinary standards,
can constitute a sufficient basis upon

which to predicate liability. In summary,
the key elements of this area are:
(1) "public figure" Is the person
about whom the statements are
made one who is reasonably wellknown to the public either because
of the position he holds or because
of his own activities and selfexposure?
(2) "public official" - Is the person
about whom the statements are
made a government employee who
has, or appears to have, substantial responsibility for, or control over, the conduct of governmental affairs?
(3) "official conduct" - Is the content
of the statements concerned with
his official conduct and only those
personal characteristics having a
direct bearing on his qualification
to carry on that conduct?
(4) "actual malice" - Are the statements made with a reasonable
belief in their truth and have steps
been taken which a reasonable
person would take to determine
their truth or falsity? If not, was
the failure to do so merely negligent or were the circumstances
such that the failure to use available opportunities to investigate
is indicative of a reckless disregard
for the truth?
(5) "highly unreasonable conduct"
In light of all the circumstances,
including the immediacy of the
need for publication, have the ordinary standards of investigation
and reporting, adhered to by responsible publishers, been followed?

14
Affirmative answers to the above questions
would seem very clearly to indicate that
the particular publication in question
would be insulated from liability under
the standards announced in Times, Rosenblatt, Butts and Walker.
Many cases have come down following
the Times decision. Some of the holdings
can be summarized as follows:
(1) Times is not limited to elected
public officials. 32 It applies to candidates for public office. 33 "Public
official" includes a police lieutenant 34 and an attorney in the office
of the Corporation Counsel of the
3
City of New York. (2)

(3)

Comments must pertain to "official
conduct" and personal facts bearing directly on qualifications for
36
public office.
Rewording of an official report so
that what was called an "allegation"
in the report is stated as a "fact"
in the defamatory publication constitutes a severe departure from
ordinary publishing standards. 7
Where an editorial writer relied on
a news story in the New York
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Times, the reputations of that
paper and of the writer of the
story were sufficient to refute a
claim of reckless disregard for the
truth."" An attempt to interview
plaintiff to get his side of the
story, coupled with lack of any
awareness of the probable falsity of
the information given by sources,
was found sufficient to indicate adherence to high publishing
standards.3 9
(4)

A person may become a "public
figure" by thrusting himself into
the public eye through statements
concerning questions of national
interest. 40 A mayor's law partner
is within the Times standard since
he chose to enter public controversy over a municipal code of
ethics.41

The Times and Butts-Walker
Standards
The extension of the protection of the
first amendment freedoms in the above
cases greatly expands the area in which
comment on public officials and matters
of public interest can be made. But, because the extension has occurred so re-

Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966).
3 Block v. Benton, 44 Misc. 2d 212, 255
N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
34 Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264

39Schneph

N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
37 Schneph v. New York Post Corp., 16 N.Y.2d
1011, 213 N.E.2d 309, 265 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1965).
36 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966);
Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.
2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
.7 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966).

!)New
York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d
567 (5th Cir. 1966).
40 pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc.
2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
afJ'd nem., 27 App. Div. 2d 903, 281 N.Y.S.
2d 716 (1st Dep't 1967).
41 Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251
N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1964), afl'd mer.,
15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.
2d 29 (1965).

32

v. New York Post Corp., 16 N.Y.
2d 1011, 213 N.E.2d 309, 265 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1965).
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cently, a good deal of uncertainty is left
as to particular applications of the principles enunciated.
As with any new
development in the law, certainty comes
only with refinement through interpretation in subsequent cases and, until there
has been sufficient time for this refinement to occur, conclusions and projections must be, at best, tentative.
Particularly uncertain is the application of the Butts-Walker test, adhered to by only four justices, of "highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." 42 In
Butts, a national publisher of a weekly
magazine failed to check the accuracy of
readily available sources for an expose'
which presumably took some time to
prepare. Its failure to do so was found
to come within the above description of
conduct sufficient to impose liability for
comment on a "public figure." Walker,
in contrast, involved "hot" news, reported
by a reporter on the scene, which was
not practicably subject to investigation according to ordinary standards in light of
the immediacy of the need for publication.
The Court therefore found that the defendant's conduct did not fall within the
above proscription. In Times, the allegedly
defamatory advertisement was printed
even though the Times had not checked
news accounts of the events referred to
in the advertisement to corroborate the
advertisement's accuracy. Reliance on the
reputation of the sponsors of the advertisement and the lack of any reason to

42 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,

155 (1967).

suspect the truth of its contents was
deemed sufficient to indicate that there
was no reckless disregard for the truth
of the published matter. Thus, where a
"public official" is involved, mere failure
to take steps to check the accuracy of the
matter to be published, when there is no
reasonable basis for suspecting its falsity
and no practical opportunity to do so,
will not be sufficient to establish the misconduct necessary to impose liability. In
specific relation to student publications
of all kinds, the greatest degree of uncertainty arises as to the application of
the Butts-Walker "responsible publisher"
standard.
The publishers involved in
those cases both had extensive newsgathering facilities and personnel.
In
terms of the status and resources of the
defendants in those cases, the investigating
and reporting standards were justifiably
high. The question arises, however, as
to how this standard should be applied
to publishers of lesser status with fewer
and less extensive resources. It would
seem illogical and contrary to the rationale
of the cases to require the same standards
to be adhered to by such disparate entities.
The choice is between narrowly defining the "standards adhered to by responsible publishers," by reference to the
standards of such mammoths as the New
York Times and the Associated Press,
or more broadly defining them, in terms
of the status and resources of the particular publisher involved. Stated differently, can responsibility be regarded as
a function of the size, wealth and investigative resources of the publisher? In
terms of student publications, the argument for an affirmative answer to the
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above question is especially strong. Coupled with the apparent ordinary lack of
investigative capability, there is the additional fact that student publications are
almost universally staffed by non-professionals with limited access to sources of
information and verification. It would
certainly seem unjustifiable to judge a
student newspaper's comment on a public
figure by the same standard as would be
applied to a similar comment by the New
York Times or the Associated Press.
Though this argument is strong, it is by
no means certain that it will be accepted
and, if it is not, the student publication,
commenting on public officials or public
figures, will necessarily have to exercise
greater caution to compensate for its lack
of resources. As stated above, however,
this precise question will have to await
resolution by the courts before definitive
answers can be given.
Conclusion
It appears that a number of privileges
are available to student publishers. But
these may be lost in various ways.
The indiscriminate circulation to anyone desiring to obtain the publication is
certain to defeat any claim of qualified
privilege.
It is strongly recommended
that the circulation of such publications
be re-examined to determine whether it
is sufficiently circumscribed as to qualify
for such a privilege. The question of how
limited the circulation must be depends
upon the extent of the common interest
being asserted. It seems safe to conclude
that circulation to students, faculty members,
administrators,
employees
and
alumni, all of whom share an interest in
matters concerning education, would be
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within the boundaries of circulation limited to those sharing a common interest.
It also seems clear that non-intentional,
incidental or unavoidable circulation to
persons outside the above groups would
not be sufficient to defeat the claim of
privilege, but the very vagueness of these
terms indicates that caution should be
exercised in favor of limiting circulation
policies and practices to avoid the possibility of being defeated by an adverse
interpretation of those terms. This is
especially true in light of the fact that
there has been, as yet, no litigation on
this precise point which can be used as
a practical and effective guide for the
development of such policies and practices.
Perhaps the most effective safeguard
is the education of all those involved in
student publications. Student writers and
editors, as previously mentioned, generally
are unaware of and unconcerned with the
possibility of liability in damages for defamation. Accordingly, information as to
the very real threat of such liability should
be provided to them for two reasons: to
protect the students themselves from a
liability which they are generally unprepared to assume and, secondly, to
protect the institution under whose auspices these students publish.
Furthermore, any faculty advisor should be fully
aware of the legal problems involved and
should be able to recognize them so that
steps can be taken to prevent the publication of defamatory matter. Necessarily,
such a recommendation precludes the use
of an advisor who is such in name only
and whose function and responsibility are
considered only after problems have
(Continued on page 88)

